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A B S T R A C T
The dairy value chain of Nairobi is comprised, in its majority, of small-scale independent enterprises that operate
within a complex interlinked system. In this complexity, the coordination and power structures of the system
may have major influences on the management of dairy food safety. Therefore, the aim of this study was to
investigate the governance structure and challenges faced by stakeholders throughout the Nairobi dairy value
chain and assess their potential implications on food safety. Qualitative data were collected through focus group
discussions and key informant interviews based on a dairy value chain mapping framework previously devel-
oped. Thematic analysis enabled identification of governance themes, key challenges and analysis of their im-
plications on food safety. Themes were organized depending on their association with farmers (informal set-
tlement or peri-urban), dairy cooperatives, dairy traders, processing companies, retailers or government officers.
The identified governance themes included: i) weak linkage between government and farmers, ii) inadequate
compliance with government regulations by traders and retailers, iii) emphasis on business licenses and permits
for revenue rather than for food safety, iv) multiple licensing resulting in high business cost and lack of com-
pliance, v) fragmented regulation, vi) unfair competition and vii) sanctions that do not always result in com-
pliance. The key challenges identified included, among others: i) inadequate farmer support, ii) harassment of
traders and retailers and iii) high business costs for traders, retailers, dairy cooperatives and large processors.
The implication of governance and challenges of food safety were, among others: i) inadequate extension ser-
vices, ii) insufficient cold chain, iii) delivery of adulterated and low milk quality to bulking centers, iv) in-
adequate food safety training and v) lack of policies for management of waste milk. The range of issues high-
lighted are based on stakeholders’ perceptions and reflects the complexity of the relationships between them.
Many of the governance themes demonstrate the linkages that are both beneficial or confrontational between the
formal and informal sectors, and between industry and regulatory authorities, with possible direct food safety
consequences. Findings obtained provide indications to decision-makers of potential governance areas that could
help improve efficiency and food safety along the dairy value chain.
1. Introduction
By 2050, demand for milk consumption will triple in Africa and
particularly in East Africa driven by population growth, increasing ur-
banization and improved purchasing power due to economic growth
(Herrero et al., 2014). Kenya is one of the countries in Africa with high
milk consumption estimated to be between 50 and 100 L of milk per
person annually (Bosire et al., 2017). The significance and prominence
of the Kenya dairy sector is exemplified by its nutritional importance
(Dominguez-Salas et al., 2016), its 3.5% contribution to the total gross
domestic product (Muriuki et al., 2003), its economic value estimated
at 230 million US dollars (Kaitibie et al., 2010) and creation of nu-
merous job opportunities. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the
United Nations (FAO) estimates that for every 1000 L of milk handled
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daily, about 841,000 full-time jobs are created at farm level and 15,000
jobs at processing level (FAO, 2011a). Further, the sector is a source of
livelihood to more than 2.6 million people representing 80% of small-
scale producers (KDB, 2014) and benefiting more than 80% of the
people involved in informal milk trading (Leksmono et al., 2006).
The dairy value chains supplying Nairobi are characterized by
fragmented structures, which resulted from liberalization of the dairy
sector in the 1990s (Leksmono et al., 2006). Average milk consumption
by city dwellers is generally high with poor households consuming
approximately 1 L of milk per week (Cornelsen et al., 2016; James and
Palmer, 2015). Rearing of dairy cows is not a major activity within
Nairobi and over 90% of milk consumed in the city is supplied through
value chains linked to production outside the city (Alarcon et al.,
2017a). As a result, Nairobi’s dairy value chain is characterized by
complex interactions between a vast number of small-scale actors who
mainly operate independently but are highly interconnected (Kiambi
et al., 2018). Seven chain profiles (or system segments) constitute most
of Nairobi’s dairy value chain (Fig. 1). These chain profiles include: i)
farming systems in urban informal settlement areas, ii) farming systems
in peri-urban areas, iii) traders affiliated to the Dairy Traders Associa-
tion (DTA), iv) traders not-affiliated to the DTA, v) medium-size dairy
cooperatives, vi) large dairy cooperatives and vii) large processing
companies. Each of the chain profiles links to another, thus forming the
overall complex dairy food system. With increasing population growth,
rapid urbanization coupled with unmatched demand and supply, the
Nairobi dairy system will continue to evolve putting pressure on the
existing value chains and triggering evolution of new chains, further
complicating the already complex food system.
Several studies conducted in Kenya show the occurrence of various
foodborne illnesses and presence of numerous hazards in milk. A study
conducted to establish health hazards in milk under different marketing
conditions found that up to 80% of samples did not meet the national
bacterial quality standards (Omore et al., 2000). Furthermore, another
study reported that for every 10,000 servings of unpasteurized milk
consumed in Kenya, two to three cases of diarrheal disease result from
common toxin-producing bacterium like Escherichia coli (Grace et al.,
2008). In addition, high levels of aflatoxins M1 (Kagera et al., 2019;
Kang’ethe and Lang’a, 2009; Kuboka et al., 2019), antibiotic residues
Fig. 1. Flow diagram indicating overall structure of the dairy food system operating in Nairobi. The figure identifies major chain segments (or chain profiles)
composing the dairy system and differentiate between non/minimally regulated chains (informal– in red) and the regulated chains (formal – in blue). Source (Kiambi
et al., 2018). (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article).
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(Ondieki et al., 2017), antibiotic resistant bacteria (Ombui et al., 2000)
and zoonotic disease causing agents like Brucella abortus and Escherichia
coli 0157:H7 have been reported in both raw and pasteurized milk at
farm and market levels (Kang’ethe et al., 2007b, 2000).
Efficient food safety control is strongly linked to the way food
chains are organized and governed. The concept of governance de-
scribes the structure of interactions, power and coordination mechan-
isms existing between actors (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2000a). Several
authors argue that interactions of actors within the systems are not just
random, but are somehow organized (Gereffi, 1994; Gereffi et al., 2005;
Kaplinsky and Morris, 2000b; Porter, 1998, 1980). Matters about who
decides what is produced, why particular stakeholders interact, what
type of rules exist (whether these are legislation, private standards or
cultural norms), how these are enforced and codified (includes in-
centives, agreements and sanctions) and who are the rule makers in the
system are all explained by value chain governance.
An understanding of how such chains are organized and co-
ordinated is important in determining the point of entry to bring in-
terventions that aim to improve or modify the chains (FAO, 2011b;
Kaplinsky and Morris, 2000a). This is further emphasized by Michael
Porter’s concept on enhancing competitiveness for business models that
aims at identifying the points of greatest force that would result in the
greatest competitive advantage (Porter, 1985). This is because those
involved at every level of the value chain need to see their importance
and what they stand to ultimately gain to motivate optimal cooperation
(Kaplinsky and Morris, 2000b). For example, Kenya milk trading is
dominated by small-scale informal traders who control over 80% of all
marketed milk (Leksmono et al., 2006). Informal systems are defined as
enterprises that are not registered or licensed to operate and therefore
are very difficult to regulate and monitor food safety hazards and risks
(Delia and Roesel, 2014; Grace et al., 2010). Being aware of this, there
have been attempts by the Kenyan government to organize the dairy
system by training and certification of informal traders through a pro-
gram dubbed, “formalization of the informal sector” (Alonso et al.,
2018; Omore and Baker, 2009). Although food safety benefits are ex-
pected in such organized and well-regulated systems, a study docu-
mented by Kiambi et al. (2018) established that trained and certified
traders affiliated to the DTA continued to operate with similar practices
as the non-trained traders who were not affiliated to the DTA. In ad-
dition, the study reported that the number of traders adopting training
and certification remained low, primarily due to the high cost of ac-
quiring multiple licenses from different government agencies (Alonso
et al., 2018). Such arrangements coupled with fragmented regulations
have been reported to compromise efforts toward promoting food safety
(Abebe et al., 2017; Gereffi and Lee, 2009). In Lebanon, for example,
food safety issues have been described to be addressed by several leg-
islative and regulatory decrees with overlapping functions (Abebe et al.,
2017) and the food safety laws are termed as fragmented and limited in
scope and scale to cover all parts of the food supply chain (Abebe et al.,
2017; El-Jardali et al., 2014). Another study conducted in Vietnam
found that relationships between farmers and milk collection points
were mainly driven by proximity to milk collection centers located by
roadsides for the large processing companies. The study found that
societal connections were very influential in milk marketing such that
social proximity was found to reduce uncertainties related to price,
quality and quantity, and enabled access to informal credit, information
and knowledge (Nguyen et al., 2017). This was particularly beneficial
for farmers who were organized in hubs/groups, a model that was
perceived to particularly benefit small-scale producers. In Kenya, a
study implemented to support dairy smallholder commercialization
found that although farmers were best suited to coordinate themselves
horizontally (with other farmers), they were not necessarily best posi-
tioned to enhance vertical coordination (with other stakeholders) as
they lacked such capacities (Kilelu et al., 2019). Farmers were observed
to struggle with dilemmas such as inclusion, loyalty, trust and im-
balanced power relations both among farmers and with other value
chain actors. These studies suggest that successful coordination and
governance of agri-food chains requires other intermediary arrange-
ments that build on alliances between farmer organizations and other
public or private organizations (Kilelu et al., 2019). However, such
coordination is not always effective, especially in complex food systems
and with multiple regulatory agents. These studies therefore generate
important information on how analysis of governance enhances co-
ordination to improve the robustness of a food system, but they lack the
holistic analysis approach in respect to food safety.
The aim of the current study is to investigate the governance
structure of Nairobi dairy value chain and its influence on food safety.
Subsequently, this study builds on our previous report on mapping of
dairy value chain in Nairobi (Kiambi et al., 2018) and provides pol-
icymakers, researchers and private stakeholders with relevant in-
formation for policy interventions to improve on the food safety system.
2. Methods
This cross-sectional study was implemented in Nairobi county, the
capital city of Kenya between January 2014 and January 2015. The
County, which lies on 696.1 km2 of land is divided into nine adminis-
trative Sub-counties namely Westlands, Kasarani, Lang’ata, Embakasi,
Starehe, Njiru, Makadara, Kamukunji and Dagoretti (Fig. 2). It lies
between longitudes 36° 45′ East and latitudes 1° 18′ South at an altitude
of 1798 m above sea level. The temperatures range between 10 °C and
29 °C while a bi-modal rainfall pattern is experienced usually with an
annual mean of approximately 786.5 mm. Nairobi, the largest city in
Kenya represents 9.2% of the country’s human population. The popu-
lation has grown by 45% from 3.1 million people in 2009 (KNBS, 2010)
to 4.4 million in 2019 (KNBS, 2019). This means an increase of 130,000
people on average per year translating to an annual growth rate of 4.1%
which agrees with previous prediction for urban growth rate in Africa
placed at approximately 4% (Aubry et al., 2010). Based on the current
population and Aubry’s projection, Nairobi is predicted to have a total
human population of about 10.3 million by the year 2050. This rapid
population growth is expected to create a lot of pressure to produce and
supply more food for the city dwellers which may trigger evolution of
more complex food chains which may as well present challenges with
food safety standards. In order to understand the governance structure
and associated challenges within the Nairobi dairy system, initial fra-
mework developed by Kiambi et al. (2018) identified seven profiles/
chain segments (Fig. 1) onto which the current study was overlaid
(Kiambi et al., 2018). Three research questions were examined: i) What
are the governance challenges experienced by different actors in the
chains? ii) What are the main governance factors that explain stake-
holders’ interactions and chain behavior? and iii) What are the food
safety implications that can be derived from the challenges and gov-
ernance factors identified?
2.1. Selection of study participants
As a first step, a desktop review was done to identify the main or-
ganizations and people involved in the Nairobi dairy value chain in
order to determine the process of data collection. Subsequently, key
informant interviews (KIIs) with relevant senior staff at the Directorate
of Veterinary Services (DVS), Directorate of Livestock Production and
the Kenya Dairy Board (KDB) were conducted to complete and validate
the list of stakeholders to interview, and to provide initial under-
standing of the governance in the system.
From the scoping visits, important segments of the value chain were
identified for detailed data collection, including dairy farmers (urban
and peri-urban), traders (DTA and non-DTA), bulking centers (collec-
tion centers, dairy cooperatives), large milk processors and public of-
ficers. The latter includes KDB officers in charge of licensing, city
council officers, livestock production officers (LPOs) and public health
officers (PHOs). In total, 22 focus group discussions (FGDs) with 116
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people and 15 KIIs with 19 people were conducted at various nodes of
Nairobi’s dairy value chain (Table 1). When possible, interviews were
done with representatives of associations or institutions (e.g. DTA) or
senior managers in charge of enterprises (e.g. dairy cooperatives or
large processors).
2.2. Data collection by interviews
Interview guides were used to gather data from the FGDs and KIIs.
These were tailored for each FGD and KII based on participants’ type of
activities (production, bulking, processing, regulation etc.) but the
structure maintained a similar pattern of questions. Data were video
audio recorded when possible and a minimum of two research assis-
tants recorded the discussions in notebooks.
In each FGD, a local person who understood the local language (s)
was identified to clarify words or statements unclear to the group.
Participants were allowed to brainstorm on each question until there
was consensus on the issue under discussion. Prompts such as ‘why’ and
‘how’ were used to stimulate participants for detailed discussions on
important arguments. Participants were asked to describe:
1) Their enterprise and operations. For example, for dairy farmers,
efforts were made to understand farm management practices
(feeding, breeding, animal health services, selling of milk); traders
were asked to describe patterns for milk sourcing, products they
deal with, value addition and selling patterns, among others.
2) Their interactions. For each of the interactions mentioned (with
buyers/sellers/associations/government) participants were asked
to:
a Describe their affiliations or lack of affiliations to any associations
or power groups (participants were prompted to give reasons for
being or not being in such groups).
b Describe how a deal is made and the types of agreements made
(e.g. written contract, verbal agreement etc.).
c List the types of incentives for dealing with the said people or
organizations.
d List the types of agreements, rules and regulations they had to
follow (legislative, private standards etc.).
e List the types of sanctions/penalties experienced for not adhering
to such agreements.
f Describe the challenges they faced within interactions.
3) Explain how their perceptions and practices influenced milk quality
and safety. Probing was used to understand:
a Practices at production, collection/bulking, processing and
transportation.
b Influence of regulation and private standards.
A similar approach was used for each of the key informants but with
the addition of describing their role in influencing the chain. Some
examples of the questionnaires used for this study are provided in the
supplementary material.
2.3. Data analysis
The voice and video recordings were carefully listened to and all the
information was collated into pre-formatted templates (i.e. Word docu-
ments organized to enter qualitative data in distinct sections based on
predefined categories such as interactions, incentives, food safety etc.). Data
entry was complemented with data collected in notebooks and on the flip
charts created with participants during the FGDs and KIIs.
Thematic qualitative analysis was performed to identify emerging
themes that provided an understanding of a challenge incurred by value
chain stakeholders, a governance factor or an associated food safety
factor. Themes were categorized by type of stakeholder: urban (in-
formal settlement) and peri-urban farmers, DTA trader, non-DTA
trader, retailers, dairy cooperatives, large processing companies and the
different types of public regulators (as established by Kiambi et al.
(2018)).
Fig. 2. Map of Nairobi County showing the study sites and type of interviews that were done.
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A theme was considered a challenge when it represented a barrier to
entry or upgrade, or for efficient or safe completion of an activity. A
theme was considered related to governance if it involved interaction of
stakeholders, structural organization of power groups, chain dom-
inance, rule setting and/or following (private standards, legislation or
other norms), types of agreements and rule enforcement (including
sanctions and penalties). Themes that could be categorized as both a
challenge and related to governance were placed in the governance
section (e.g. a power group imposing a barrier to a stakeholder). Food
safety implications were then derived from participants’ explanations of
how governance and challenges impact food safety behavior, or
through authors’ deductions on resulting themes.
3. Results
3.1. Dairy farmers
3.1.1. Farmers’ challenges
Seven challenges were identified among all groups (Table 2). All
farmer groups described problems with artificial insemination (AI)
services that often failed due to untimely heat detection by famers or
unskilled AI providers, increasing the need for repeat insemination.
These AI providers were perceived to be money driven rather than by
professionalism. Animal feeds was also a challenge reported in the three
groups, as often they were insufficiently available, costly and of low
quality, particularly the commercially acquired hay and concentrates.
Some farmers had to use unorthodox sourcing of feeds, such as leftovers
from markets or dumpsites, and green pastures growing by sewer lines
(farmers in informal settlement areas) and by the roadside (peri-urban
farmers). Diminishing land size necessary for cultivation of fodder and
extension of herds was listed as the main reason for these issues, with
land size changes driven by growing urbanization and property devel-
opments like real estates. This poor reproduction efficiency and high
cost of inputs were stated as the reasons for a perceived lack of profits,
which was worsened by their frustration in accessing credit and loan
facilities to boost their dairy enterprises. Farmers reported mostly to
rely on other farmers to access any information related to dairy
farming. Farmers in informal settlements reported that they mostly rely
on unqualified persons and self-treatment of their livestock.
3.1.2. Governance themes associated with dairy farmers and implications
for food safety
The governance themes identified by farmers and their implications
for food safety are presented in Table 3. Several themes pointed to a
general self-reliance by farmers due to insufficient access to govern-
ment support and lack of capacity to receive training due to lack of
associations in informal settlement areas or low membership in dairy
cooperatives in peri-urban areas. Farmers said there was a ready milk
market and therefore felt no need for associations, while others men-
tioned that the incentives for dairy cooperative affiliation was to access
credit facilities or services (animal feeds, AI and health services, soft
loans). Whereas farmers affiliated to dairy cooperatives received some
training and extensions services, those in informal settlement areas
reported fear of sanctions (arrest, jail, confiscation of livestock) for
keeping livestock in the city which was seen as being outlawed; this
explained why they could not attend any training organized by gov-
ernment. It was perceived that farmers’ preferred selling milk to haw-
kers or traders (rather than cooperatives) for quick cash and better
prices and that it was easy to switch traders who refused to compromise
on milk quality (adulteration). Furthermore, farmers reported a lack of
contracts with traders. While farmers did not perceive that milk was
controlled by any power group, feed price was however seen to be
controlled by just a few companies, which increases the cost of pro-
duction and the need to access alternative informal low-quality feeds.Ta
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3.2. Traders and retailers
3.2.1. Challenges associated with traders and retailers
The list of challenges reported by DTA, non-DTA and retailers are
shown in Table 4. A common theme for all groups was the perceived
inability to obtain the multiple, costly and cumbersome licenses re-
quired by KDB and city council. For example, Table 5 shows the basic
requirements necessary to operate a retail milk bar. Besides stringent
specifications for premises (tiled walls, cemented floors, running water
etc.), approximately Kenya shillings 18,100−42,200 (USD 180–420) is
required to purchase licenses/permits for milk retailing at a milk bar.
This amount is excluding daily cess (type of revenue that is paid to KDB
on every liter of milk handled per month). Apart from a few DTA tra-
ders who operate with a few licenses, most of the traders and retailers
reported operating without any required licenses. Consequently, cor-
ruption and harassment of non-DTA and retailers were cited as a big
challenge. For example, non-DTA traders reported that during the wet
season, city council officers poured their milk out and arraigned the
trader in a court of law where they were fined or jailed. During the dry
season, traders reported that the officers would confiscate their milk
and did not arraign them in court.
Non-DTA traders and retailers reported challenges in sourcing milk
from multiple farmers due to low productivity per farm, hence they lost
valuable business time roaming from farm to another. Additionally,
non-DTA traders complained of KDB’s demand for aluminum containers
for milk transportation which they described as being heavy, difficult to
carry in public service vehicles and associated with losses due to spil-
lage. Consequently, they reported use of non-food grade plastic con-
tainers. While some traders reported cleaning the containers with hot
water and soap, they said some traders used other preservation methods
like addition of formalin and hydrogen peroxide to minimize spoilage
while transporting milk over long distances without a cold chain.
For DTA members, the main challenge mentioned relates to the
extremely low membership in their association, which deflates their
efforts to negotiate for better regulation and marketing terms. They
were also unable to sell to institutions because the law prohibits sale of
unpasteurized milk to consumers, yet the cost of setting up pasteur-
ization units was unaffordable. Their attempt to obtain pasteurization
services at a small fee by the large processing companies was futile;
they cited unending fights between large processors and DTA who were
seen to compete unfairly, since they were perceived to require less
capital and smaller business running costs than large processors.
3.2.2. Governance themes associated with dairy traders and retailers and
implications on food safety
Governance themes identified by traders and retailers are provided
in Table 3. Registration with DTA requires traders to pay a certain fee
and undergo training by specific KDB-accredited business development
service providers on milk handling, hygiene, bookkeeping, business
ethics and value addition. The majority of traders were not affiliated
with DTA, which was reported to be due to unwillingness to pay for this
training citing its high cost, the ability to sell and make profits without
the training, the perception that farmers and consumers did not require
traders be trained to buy/sell milk, the difficulties in adhering to rules
set by DTA and KDB (high milk standards and multiple licenses) and
lack of protection by government from unfair competition with un-
trained non-DTA traders. This was perceived as a reduction in the ca-
pacity to negotiate or influence the chain. For instance, traders per-
ceived that the access to institutions and high-end markets was also
hindered by the large processing companies, who quoted exorbitant
charges for pasteurization services. This was seen as an ability to ra-
pidly influence milk prices in the market. This generates a negative
perception of traders for these companies. On the other hand, non-DTA
traders and retailers reported it was easy to start a milk business, but it
required one to be strategic to evade licenses and regulation. They
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reported the existence of strong social networks that supported them in
milk sourcing and selling, and to bail out when arrested.
All the groups reported that they targeted low-income consumers
and low incentive to reject unsuitable milk due to insufficient supply
and added value to spoiled milk (fermented or yoghurt). Traders re-
ported that some large processing companies provided farmers and
traders with hydrogen peroxide (in tablet form) to add into milk to
prevent spoilage during long distance transport when they had no cold
chain facilities.
3.3. Dairy cooperatives and large processing companies
3.3.1. Challenges associated with dairy cooperatives and large processing
companies
Challenges associated with dairy cooperatives and large processing
companies are provided in Table 6. Lack of coolers was reported as a
big challenge by cooperatives due to high cost of installation and
maintenance. This was reiterated by the large processors who in addi-
tion cited low milk volumes in the country as a major disincentive for
such investments. Cooperatives and large processors reiterated their
frustration regarding frequent milk rejections which they complained
promotes unfair competition especially with the informal sector. De-
spite internal guidelines regarding milk quality, sometimes they were
forced by circumstances to accept milk of lower quality. This was at-
tributed to low farm production of milk which led to increased com-
petition with the informal sector, who were perceived to not care much
about milk quality. It was reported that there were no policies for
management or disposal of the rejected or spoiled milk, other than
giving it back to the supplier. Rejected milk was therefore reported to
be sold for pigs (cooperatives and large processors) or converted to
home-made yoghurt or sold as ‘mala’ (traditionally fermented milk) by
farmers, traders and retailers. Additionally, cooperatives and large
processors echoed their frustrations with lack of adequate infrastructure
citing the poor road network in production areas and lack of physical
Table 3
Governance themes identified by farmers, traders and retailers in the dairy value chains.
Node Governance themes Food safety implications (*author’s view)
Farmers Lack of farmers’ associations (urban informal area); low membership
to cooperatives in peri-urban areas (All farmers)
*Lack of associations and fear of government prevents access to food safety training
Farmers learn from each other, rare interaction with government
(Farmers, cooperatives, LPOs)
*Low cost of switching to hawkers and ready market implies traders have low power to
sanction farmers based on food safety and increased risk of unsafe milk sold
Prefer selling to hawkers - better price and pay cash on delivery (Farmers
in peri urban)
*Control of feed prices by few companies generates lack of access to quality feeds for
some farmers, who then shift to informal sources with low quality. This may lead to
cross-contamination and disease vulnerability
Lack of formal contracts but operates on trust (All farmers, traders, retailers) *Pressure to avoid financial losses nudges some farmers to not observe withdrawal period
or to dispose of unsuitable milk
Low cost of switching to other hawkers (easy to switch traders) (Farmers
in peri urban)
Women more involved at production, but men decide on selling of
cows (Farmers in peri urban)
Consumer preference to buy milk directly from farmers (All farmers)
Few feed companies control feed prices (Dairy cooperatives)
Financial pressure not to dispose of milk during treatment for disease
(All farmers)
Farmers are responsible for maintenance of some milk collection
centers (Farmers in peri urban)
Traders
and retailers
Do not see added value for training since they can still make profits
(DTA and non−DTA traders)
*Traders not part of DTA do not have access to food safety training provided by the
association
Difficulty to adhere to KDB rules and DTA code of ethics (DTA traders and
retailers)
*Traders not willing to pay for training- lack of incentives
Target low income people because they demand cheaper prices (DTA
traders and retailers)
*Lack of access to pasteurization services reverts to selling of raw milk to consumers
Unable to sell to institutions - law restrict selling of raw milk (DTA and
non−DTA traders)
*Trained traders can profit from value addition knowledge and avoid use of unsuitable
milk
Exorbitant pasteurization fee by the large processing companies (DTA
traders)
*Cost of multiple licenses incentivizes operation without medical certificate and
avoidance of food safety regulations
Easy to start business, if not paying license (DTA, non−DTA traders and
retailers)
*Lack of food safety control of milk during transportation (based on trust)
Unlicensed businesses located far from main roads to escape regulation
(non−DTA traders)
*The pressure to avoid financial losses nudges traders to convert spoiled milked into
fermented milk or yoghurt
Lack of contract and operates on trust (DTA and non−DTA traders) *Large processing companies provide traders with hydrogen peroxide to conserve milk
during long distance transportation without cold chain. This reduces incentive for traders
and farmers to observe hygienic practices
Farmers decide on mode of payment by traders (DTA, non−DTA traders and
retailers)
Negative perception of traders by large processing companies (DTA and
non−DTA traders)
Women dominate dairy business in informal settlements (non−DTA
traders)
Area chiefs resolve disputes of rejected milk (non−DTA traders)
Non-DTA have strong social networks for milk selling and support in
crisis (non−DTA traders)
Prefer to sell raw to avoid extra cost and sell at cheaper prices (DTA and
non−DTA traders)
New hawkers work under existing hawkers to gain trust (DTA and
non−DTA traders)
Pressure of rejecting milk due to lack of supply (DTA, non−DTA traders and
retailers)
The people in brackets is the type of stakeholder who said that in the interview.
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sheds for milk collection (milk collected by roadsides). Apart from the
high cost linked to milk collection from many farmers/collection cen-
ters, breakdown of vehicles and thereby delayed delivery of milk to
destinations was identified as a major challenge associated with high
levels of milk contamination and spoilage.
3.3.2. Governance themes associated with dairy cooperatives and large
processing companies and implications on food safety
Table 7 displays the governance themes associated with dairy co-
operatives and large processing companies. Both groups suggested that
a milk trading environment exists that displays unfair competition.
They reported that: i) the government failed to regulate the informal
sector while overregulating the formal chains (cooperatives and pro-
cessors), ii) the KDB had started formalizing traders through training
and registration (DTA), iii) they lacked support in infrastructure de-
velopment associated with high costs of milk collection from farms, iv)
with devolved system of governance, several counties (subnational)
were setting up dairy plants (further reducing milk that they received
from rural areas), v) inability to compete with traders on pricing since
traders had minimal operating costs and vi) it was a struggle to reject
milk since it would be accepted elsewhere (lack of policies for man-
agement of rejected milk). This unfair competition was believed to
generate a lack of effective monitoring and reduced the incentive to
comply with food safety regulations along the value chains. Several
positive incentives were mentioned that may influence farmers to join
and supply the dairy cooperatives and large processing companies.
These were financial, through improved access to credit or better
payment, and technical, through provision of services (e.g. animal
health) or access to training. On the other hand, sanctions were in place
to reduce milk rejections (especially through bad practices, such as milk
adulteration) and to incentivize farmers to avoid selling milk to in-
dependent traders. This contrasted with the perception that dairy co-
operatives are unwilling to pay for milk quality, reducing the incentive
for farmers to improve.
3.4. Government officers
These include the KDB, PHOs, LPOs and city council officers. The
role of KDB is regulation of the dairy sector through enforcement of the
Dairy Industry Act CAP 366. The board is responsible for inspection and
licensing of milk handling premises and surveillance on quality and
safety of milk and milk products along the dairy value chain. The
Nairobi city council is responsible for licensing of businesses. They
provide single business permits, business medical certificates, em-
ployees’ medical certificates, inspect installation of fire extinguishers at
business premises and facilitate garbage collection. The responsibility
of PHOs was reported to be food and sanitary inspection of premises,
offering of medical certificates and enforcing public health-related laws
like Public Health Act, CAP 242, Drugs and Chemical Substance Act,
CAP 254, Meat Control Act, CAP 354 and regulation of food related city
Table 4
Challenges associated with dairy traders and retailers.
DTA Non-DTA Retailers Food safety implications (*authors’ view)
Must source milk from many farms because of low production per farm ✓ ✓ *Reduced capacity to establish contract and, hence, food
safety agreements with suppliers
Competition for sourcing, not for selling milk ✓ ✓ *Reduced power to establish private standards on food safety
Aluminum containers unsuitable because they are heavy, cause spillage and difficult to carry ✓ Use of plastic containers that are difficult to clean
High cost of business development training before entry into DTA ✓ *Reduced food safety knowledge and good practice by non-
DTA
Too many rules and multiple licenses required by KDB and city council ✓ ✓ ✓ *Increase of illegal business difficult to regulate and enforce
High business rent and standards in high-end market ✓ *Increased use of food safety practices in high-end markets
Lack of access to institutions (since they sell raw milk) ✓ *Milk safety control by institutions
Lack of capital to establish pasteurization unit ✓ Selling of raw milk
Lack of access to pasteurization services (from processors) ✓ Selling of raw milk
Lack of capital to buy food grade containers recommended by KDB ✓ Use of plastic containers that are difficult to clean
Harassment by city council/KDB due to lack of licenses and medical certificate ✓ ✓ *Reduced cooperation to follow food safety practices
Corruption from city council (they bribe often to continue with trading) ✓ ✓ *Reduced incentive to implement food safety practices
Insecurity because they operate very early hours (from 2 am) ✓ *Escape regulation
Emerging threat of milk vending machines (consumers prefer buying from these machines) ✓ *Perception of increased food safety and quality in milk
vending machines
Lack of training and knowledge ✓ *Reduced food safety knowledge and good practices
Low membership in DTA (only 2203 of the total 56,446 traders are active members; of the
active members, 40% are in Nairobi)
✓ *Reduced use of training and power to improve standards in
the system
Table 5
Requirements for running a retail milk bar.
Description Source Cost (*K Sh.) Valid
Application fee Application fees to KDB KDB 600 One off
Recommendation letter From KDB-certified milk supplier Supplier No charge
KDB license Certify milk business by the KDB KDB 2500 1 year
Business medical certificate Certifies premise as a food kiosk City council 5000 1 year
Single business permit To be allowed to trade in the city City council 5000−5500 1 year
Medical check-up employees Medical check-up of employee before award of medical certificate Government health facility 400−1000 1 year
Fire extinguisher inspection fee To verify fire extinguisher has been installed at the business facility City council 1000 1 year
Carriage (permit) Transport/movement permit KDB 1600 1 year
Garbage collection fee City council garbage collection City council 2000–25,000 1 year
**Cess fee Per liter of milk traded KDB 0.4/liter Monthly
Total 18,100−42,200 per year (excluding cess)
*Kenya shilling 100, approximately USD 1.
**Cess fee is a type of tax levied by the KDB for every liter of milk traded (source: http://www.kdb.go.ke/licensing-procedures/).
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by-laws. The responsibility of LPOs was reported to be advising farmers
on production through extension, monitoring of disease outbreak ru-
mors, advice on appropriate housing structures and dimensions for li-
vestock, dissemination of information, creating linkages with markets,
organizing farmer field days and training of farmers.
3.4.1. Challenges associated with government officers
Challenges reported by KDB, PHOs, LPOs, and city council officers
are reported in Table 8. Hawkers (mobile traders) were described as the
most difficult people to control and regulate; and they were perceived
to adulterate milk through addition of margarine (to deceive consumers
on high butter fat content), water (to increase volumes), antibiotics (for
preservation) and flour (to deceive consumer on milk thickness).
Hawkers were also perceived to ignore milk hygiene since their lower
milk prices compel consumers to buy from them.
Another challenge reported was the lack of medical certificates,
which was attributed to the high cost and frequency of obtaining them.
For example, it was reported that a medical certificate is required to be
renewed every six months. Officers felt that some retailers were not
comfortable with the lack of clarity on the type of test needed to obtain
the medical certificate, with many of them fearing being tested for HIV
status. Inadequate water supply was also cited as a major problem. It
was said that those people without water rarely mopped their premises
and instead only swept their floors. Furthermore, the origin of water
used for cleaning utensils was of questionable quality since it was
supplied by cart pullers. Inadequate water problems were further
complicated by poor infrastructure (semi-permanent buildings in area),
especially in the informal settlement areas which were located near
open sewage trenches. Another challenge was related to lack of cold
storage facilities; which was due to power breakdowns in supermarkets
in informal and peri-urban areas.
Lack of an adequate workforce was reported as a significant hin-
drance to effective performance by the dairy system. For example, it
was reported that there were very few government officers employed to
serve at various levels of the system from production (few extension
services by LPOs) and there was an inadequate number of staff to ef-
fectively undertake monitoring, regulation and enforcement (KDB,
PHOs, city council).
3.4.2. Governance themes associated with governance officers and their
implication on food safety
Table 9 reports governance themes identified by KDB, PHOs, LPOs
and city council officers. Lack of premises by mobile traders and re-
tailers made monitoring, regulation, training and application of sanc-
tions difficult. Due to this, the city council deployed a team of field
officers to collect daily cess and to identify retailers/traders operating
illegally without a premise, as required by law. Political interference
was cited as a big challenge in enforcement of laws. Attempts to close
uncompliant businesses met with interference by politicians who want
to be seen as the voice of people (city council, PHOs).
4. Discussion
This study investigated governance and challenges associated with
food safety in the complex dairy value chain of Kenya’s largest urban
setting. The value chain framework previously developed by Kiambi
et al. (2018) was utilized to overlay governance and challenges themes
to facilitate interpretation and clarity of results. It is agreed that com-
plex food systems require strategic analytical approaches to determine
critical points for intervention and several studies have described how
such analysis can be achieved (Alarcon et al., 2017b; FAO, 2011b;
Muloi et al., 2018; Onono et al., 2018). It is important to note that the
food safety concerns identified in this study represent stakeholders’
views and authors’ inference of the results. The extent to which these
concerns can cause high levels of food safety hazards requires further
validation, especially through risk assessment and microbiological
procedures. A detailed analysis of these risks was beyond the scope of
this study, as this study was focused on understanding the role of
Table 6
Challenges associated with dairy cooperatives and large processing companies.
Dairy cooperatives Large processing
companies
Food safety implications (*authors’ view)
Farmers reluctant to learn from free training ✓ *Reduced knowledge and good practices
Farm owners not attending training (they send attendants) ✓ *Lack of knowledge transfer to the person who has power
to enforce
Production losses due to poor heat detection by farmers ✓ *Poor efficiency implies less profits and reduced capacity
to upgrade business
Low milk supply in dry seasons ✓ ✓ *Poor efficiency implies less profits and reduced capacity
to upgrade business
Lack of breeding expertise by extension officers ✓ *Poor efficiency implies less profits and reduced capacity
to upgrade business
Low number of active members with most selling to traders because
they pay cash
✓ *Use of less regulated channels
Lack of enough coolers at bulking centers ✓ *Risk of milk spoilage
Low milk volumes to warrant installation of coolers or key
infrastructure
✓ ✓ *Lack of cold chain increases risk of milk spoilage
High milk rejection from small-scale farmers ✓ *High volumes of rejected milk increases pressure to
recirculate
High cost and poor quality of inputs discourage productivity ✓ ✓ *Poor efficiency implies less profits and reduced capacity
to upgrade business
High cost of multiple licenses ✓ ✓ *Increase of illegal business difficult to regulate and
enforce
Over taxation and double payment of cess ✓ *Increase of illegal business difficult to regulate and
enforce
Poor roads and public infrastructure ✓ ✓ *Increased risk of milk spoilage
High prevalence of animal diseases ✓ ✓ *Risk of milk contamination
Struggle to reject unsuitable milk (low supply, competitors) ✓ ✓ *Risk of unsafe milk entering the food chain
Lack of procedures for management of rejected milk ✓ ✓ *Risk of unsafe milk entering the food chain
Shortage of staff to provide extension services ✓ *Reduced food safety knowledge and good practices
Operating at half capacity due to unstable markets and machine
maintenance challenges
✓
Lack of enforcement of standards across the value chain ✓ *Reduced incentives to follow food safety practices
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governance in the creation of risks. It is clear, however, that tackling
the complex governance structure in the milk system, and in particular
the many interactions between parallel value chains, has several
downstream impacts on potential disease risks and the subsequent food-
borne disease burden in human consumers.
At production, farmers reported a general lack of or inadequate
support by the both the public and private sectors. This is characterized
by insufficient training and extension services coupled with lack of
incentives in the system. Farmers felt there was a lack of an enabling
environment to promote dairy enterprises, in particular when faced
with a high prevalence of animal diseases, high cost and low-quality
animal feeds, diminishing land for expansion of dairy (blooming of real
estate) and the lack of credit and loan facilities. This perhaps reflects
the national image of the dairy industry post liberalization in 1991
(MALF, 2013, 2010; Rademaker et al., 2016). Government divestiture
of the Kenya Cream Creameries which resulted in privatization of ser-
vices such AI, tick control and veterinary clinical services caused a
general decline in performance of the dairy sector (MALF, 2013). Food
safety implications associated with these challenges are related to
widespread lack of extension services and training, suggesting that milk
production practices and attention to food safety is dependent upon the
source of information (whether good or bad). Various studies have
explored diseases and other public health hazards in milk (Grace et al.,
2008; Kang’ethe et al., 2007a; Kang’ethe and Lang’a, 2009; Ombui
et al., 2000; Omore et al., 2000, 2002; Ondieki et al., 2017). A detailed
analysis of these risks is beyond the scope of this study, but several of
the hazards identified in those studies stem from the governance issues
discussed in the present work. It is clear that tackling the complex
governance structure in the milk system, and in particular the many
interactions between parallel value chains, has several downstream
impacts on disease risk and the subsequent food-borne disease burden
in human consumers.
The main challenges and governance issues associated with traders
and retailers were harassment by KDB, city council and PHOs for lack of
required licenses and permits due to the associated costs and cumber-
someness of obtaining them. While the laws, policies, licenses, permits
and standards are meant to streamline coordination and bring order
along the value chain, this has not been the case for Nairobi’s dairy
value chain. These findings are consistent with previous analyses that
cited inappropriate regulations as a major factor constraining devel-
opment of enterprises particularly in developing countries (Alonso
et al., 2018; Pfeffermann, 2001). In an attempt to organize informal
milk trading in Kenya, KDB established a training and certification
model that enabled formalization of the informal traders (Roesel and
Table 7
Governance themes identified by dairy cooperatives and large processing companies in the dairy value chains.
Governance themes from dairy cooperatives and large processing companies Food safety implications (*authors’ view)
Unfair competition
Failure to regulate traders and overregulation of formal chains (large processing companies)
Licensing of traders (formalization of informal sector) (large processing companies)
Inability to compete with traders on pricing and cost of production (large processing companies)
Lack of support on infrastructure development (large processing companies and dairy cooperatives)
It is a struggle to reject milk (large processing companies and dairy cooperatives)
Devolution system of governance seen as threat with most counties installing processing
plants (large processing companies)
Positive incentives
Credit access to feed, AI and animal health services and household items (but feed more
expensive) (dairy cooperatives)
–Cooperatives provide loans at lower interest rate to members (dairy cooperatives)
–Provide internal training to members only (dairy cooperatives)
–Bonus provided on amount of milk delivered and profits (large processing companies and dairy
cooperatives)
–Cooperatives test milk samples from farms with recurrent spoilage events (large dairy cooperatives)
–Long-term suppliers paid first by processing companies in times of financial crisis (large processing
companies)
–Large processing companies assure a constant price to long-term suppliers (large processing
companies)
–Large processing companies pay based on volume band system (large processing companies)
–Large processing companies recommend farmers to financial institutions for loans (large
processing companies)
Sanctions
–Farmers are forbidden to sell milk to hawkers or adulterate milk, and incur heavy sanctions if
discovered (large dairy cooperatives)
–Milk rejections are sanctions though loss of bonuses (large processing companies and dairy cooperatives)
–Farmers and traders bear the cost of milk rejections (including termination of contracts) (large
processing companies)
Others
–Cooperatives not willing to pay for quality (large dairy cooperatives)
–High private standards (need to follow a lot of internal rules) (large processing companies)
–Feel that government should develop a national protocol for the use/ disposal of rejected milk
so that it doesn’t flow back to consumers (large processing companies)
–Payment to suppliers done monthly post-delivery (large processing companies and dairy cooperatives)
–Farmers registered in cooperatives without written contract (dairy cooperatives)
–Large processing companies test milk delivered by cooperatives (large processing companies)
–Offer AI service to non-members, but paid in cash but members are deducted from milk sales at
the end of the month (dairy cooperatives)
–Members must own a cow (s) to be allowed as a member, to avoid recruiting hawkers (dairy
cooperatives)
–There is lack of control or monitoring of milk during transit (large processing companies)
–Provide training to extension agents to ensure quality (large processing companies)
–Large processing companies have written contract with most suppliers (large processing companies)
–Large processing companies monitor storage by some clients post-marketing (large processing
companies)
Cooperatives provided access to food safety training to farmers
Lack of clear protocol nudges farmers to resell rejected milk
Private standards implemented to ensure hygiene (e.g. use of adequate
aluminum containers, ISO certified, HACCP procedures)
Organoleptic tests done at collection centers and microbiological analysis at
processing centers to ensure quality control
Control mechanism to diagnose cases of recurrent spoilage
Incentive to reduce rejections though loss of bonuses
Access to cheaper loans may incentivize food safety upgrade of farms
Cooperatives provide access to private veterinarians and other animal health
services
*Hawkers are more likely to receive unsuitable milk from farmers
Processing companies feel that the greatest challenges to the quality of milk
comes from small and medium suppliers
*Long distance vehicles with lack of cooling system may be more susceptible
to milk spoilage/adulteration
Monitoring storage post-marketing ensures minimal spoilage and
overstocking of milk by retailers
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Grace, 2014). However, the mode of operation for the certified traders
was like those of uncertified traders, raising speculations that traders
were seeking to legitimize their businesses rather than improve how
they conducted business (Kiambi et al., 2018). Traders escape harass-
ment from regulators when they have a certificate, but they continue
with their original practices. Furthermore, Alonso et al. (2018) found
that there were no differences in bacterial quality of milk sourced from
trained and untrained traders, and hence highlighted the interlinkage in
the system and the difficulties in applying incentives to increase milk
quality. This may also explain the numerous food safety problems
identified at the retail nodes in the current study. Among those men-
tioned were sale of raw milk to consumers, adulteration (addition of
water or other substances like margarine and flour), value addition of
spoiled milk to be sold at cheaper prices and the addition of hydrogen
peroxide or formalin to preserve the milk for long distance transpor-
tation without a cold chain. In addition, the findings indicate that
farmers could easily switch traders/retailers who questioned the quality
of their milk, implying that there is low power to sanction farmers
Table 8
Challenges associated with government officers.
KDB PHOs City council officers LPOs Food safety implications (*authors’ view)
Milk hawkers pose biggest challenge to control ✓ ✓ ✓ Escape regulation and monitoring of food safety hazards
Lack of licenses and medical certificates ✓ ✓ ✓ Increase of illegal business difficult to regulate and enforce
Inadequate water supply ✓ ✓ ✓ *Risk of unsuitable food safety practices
Lack of cold storage facilities ✓ ✓ ✓ *Lack of cold chain increases risk of milk spoilage
Long distance transportation without cold chain ✓ ✓ ✓ *Lack of cold chain increases risk of milk spoilage
Inadequate staff to enforce regulations ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ Reduced efficiency to monitor and enforce food safety
regulations
Lack of office vehicles to facilitate license issuing; employees must walk to
premises
✓ *Poor efficiency implies reduced capacity to regulate the
system
Inappropriate milk handling (non-food grade containers) ✓ ✓ ✓ *Risk of milk contamination and spoilage
Cost of food-grade containers four times higher than plastic container ✓ *Risk of milk spoilage
Lack of access to essential amenities (toilets, difficult to clean floors, poor
waste disposal, poor drainage systems), poor personal hygiene
✓ ✓ *High risk of milk contamination
Inappropriate housing for animals (cow sheds connected to main houses) ✓ ✓ *High risk of milk contamination
Lack of knowledge (retailers) ✓ *Risk of unsafe milk entering the food chain
Conflicting hours of operation (hawkers, traders, roadside vendors operate
very early or late (when government facilities have closed)
✓ ✓ ✓ *Risk of unsafe milk entering the food chain
High cost of getting into premises is prohibitive for hawkers and roadside
vendors
✓ *Increase of unregulated chains which are difficult to
monitor and regulate
Lengthy process of sanctioning which takes 1−3 months ✓ Reduced incentive to enforce compliance
Compliance issues within lower socio-economic strata ✓ ✓ *Risk of unsafe milk being sold
Sick animals which do not respond to antibiotic treatment are sold to
butchers or traders
✓ *Risk of unsafe milk being sold
Farmers not observing antibiotic withdrawal period ✓ *Risk of unsafe milk being sold
Table 9
Governance themes identified by government officers.
Governance themes KDB City council PHOs LPOs Food safety implications (*authors’ view)
Failure of traders and retailers to obtain licenses ✓ ✓ *Sale of milk by unlicensed traders and retailers means milk escapes
regulation and monitoring for food safety risks
Hawkers lack of permanent milk trading premises makes it difficult to
apply sanctions
✓ ✓ *Increase of illegal business difficult to regulate and enforce
Specialized team from city council regulates roadside vendors and
hawkers with semi-permanent infrastructure (e.g. cess collection)
✓ *City council’s collection of revenue from unlicensed traders and
retailers escalates further sales of milk that is not monitored by KDB
for food safety risks
Political interference (politicians prevent closure of noncompliant
businesses)
✓ ✓ *Encourages unregulated chains which are difficult to monitor and
regulate
Fragmented licensing (same city council, different offices handle various
licenses that traders are required to obtain)
✓ *Increase of illegal business difficult to regulate and enforce
Traders and retailers in semi-permanent structures do not have licenses
but pay daily cess
✓ ✓ *Increase of illegal business difficult to regulate and enforce
Conflict of interest; it is illegal to sell milk without premises and licenses,
but revenue is still collected from illegally operating businesses like
hawkers and roadside vendors
✓ *Encourages unregulated chains which are difficult to monitor and
regulate
Retailers not willing to obtain licenses due to high cost and their
perceived lack of value due to inadequate services like fluctuating
electricity and poor roads
✓ ✓ *Increase of illegal business difficult to regulate and enforce
Livestock keeping is illegal in the city and farmers (in city) cannot be
licensed
✓ ✓ *Prevents farmers from seeking services from government
Retailers in high-income areas do not have a problem with compliance
(90%)
✓
Provision of training on food handling to retailers ✓ ✓ ✓
Uncompliant retailers/traders (licensing) are given a 14-day notice to
comply, otherwise arrested and taken to court (to scare the rest), or
may have their businesses closed or milk confiscated
✓ ✓
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based on food safety, thus increasing the risk for unsuitable milk to
enter the distribution chain. To ensure monitoring of food safety ha-
zards in a complex system like Nairobi, the relevant sector requires an
understanding of critical areas that require minimum interventions to
achieve maximum impact. Proper incentives and rewards may be cri-
tical to enable effective transformation of the sectors. For example, the
sector may need to invest in educating consumers who will then de-
mand quality milk. Publicly subsidizing various inputs may also provide
incentives to ensure milk quality. Training alone is not adequate as
shown by Alonso et al. (2018), but increasing both the demand for a
safe product and the earning potential of the value chain actors based
on the quality of their product will provide incentives to follow food
safety regulations. Policymakers must also take into consideration that
the informal sector employs about 80% of the people working in the
dairy sector; thus many people depend on the informal dairy sector for
their livelihoods and it is a path to reduce poverty, hunger and mal-
nutrition (Salasya et al., 2006).
At the dairy cooperative and large processing company level, the
main challenges influencing food safety were the low milk quality
(adulteration, lack of cold chain and lack of withdrawal following ad-
ministration of medicines) and lack of policies for management of milk
that has been rejected at reception with the rejects being resold to
competitors (traders). The quality of milk reaching the processing unit
defines the final quality of processed milk. Yet there are weak support
services to farmers which contributes to hygienic milk production and
handling. Considering that farmers are just a small proportion of the
country’s small scale producers, it is not surprising that such challenges
are major reasons for the lack of milk quality differentiation between
formal and informal systems (Alonso et al., 2018; Roesel and Grace,
2014; Salasya et al., 2006). Strict standards are not enough to ensure
that high-quality milk is supplied to cooperatives and large processing
companies. Farmers and distributors require capital to produce and
deliver a quality product. Farmers also require access to affordable
veterinary care, and both farmers and distributors require infra-
structure such as adequate roads.
Dairy cooperatives and processing companies report that they ac-
cept milk that should be rejected because of a lack of clear policy re-
garding management of rejected product. These entities reported that if
milk is rejected by them, it flows back into the food chain through their
competitors; as a result, they opted to accept it and assumed that it
would be diluted when mixed with other good milk. If such milk were
colored differently, or disposed of at reception, it may incentivize the
formal systems to adhere to quality control measures and enhance
compliance with food safety regulations.
The current study has established that lack of compliance to rules
and regulations was common as seen by the reluctance of various actors
to obtain licenses and permits. Ideally, business licenses and permits are
mainly used for purposes of taxation, but they also help the government
monitor and regulate businesses that may affect public safety. This
study has identified the fragmented, costly and complex regulatory
system as a barrier to compliance and to formalization of milk en-
terprises. This agrees with other studies (Alonso et al., 2018;
Pfeffermann, 2001). Often, lack of coherence in policy and practice
(fragmented system) results in one arm of the government doing
something that is contrary to the other arm of the same government.
For example, although it was illegal and strongly prohibited by KDB to
hawk or trade milk in open (without premises), the city council orga-
nized a team that collected revenue from these businesses and charged
a daily fee (not necessarily a license or permit). Other studies agree that
lack of integrated regulatory functions is a problem in the dairy sector
globally but local authorities drive the required changes based on their
identified challenges (Gereffi et al., 2005; Orden and Roberts, 2007).
For example, Gereffi et al. (2005) argues that when demand and supply
are fragmented, there is a higher likelihood of having no or limited
public standards that cover only basic food safety aspects (Gereffi et al.,
2005). Such systems are characterized by less developed private quality
and social and environmental standards. Hence, as it is, the Nairobi
dairy system will be difficult to organize until licensing is integrated
and costs reduced. If most people continue to run businesses informally,
the few numbers of regulators will continue to be overwhelmed with
non-compliant people. But once the system is organized, it means the
stakeholders will be known and it will be possible to provide system-
atized training, monitor food safety hazards and enforce the law.
While food safety concerns arise from both formal and informal
systems (Alonso et al., 2018; Roesel and Grace, 2014), and considering
the tight interactions among actors in both systems (Kiambi et al.,
2018), the government should find a common ground to holistically
address food safety challenges. Sound policy reforms have been shown
to have widespread economic benefits (Alonso et al., 2018;
Pfeffermann, 2001; Salasya et al., 2006). For example, the Nairobi dairy
value chain is vast and formal chains are somewhat integrated with
informal chains (Kiambi et al., 2018). So, emphasis on criminalizing
and penalizing actors in the informal chains without addressing factors
that hinder formalization directly impacts on possible gains that are
desired by the system, like food safety and food security. Consequently,
even the formal chains may not function optimally, as seen in their
struggle to reject any milk. In this study, it was reported that sometimes
dairy cooperatives and large processing companies received milk that
should be rejected. They argued that considering milk is scarce and
there is always a ready milk market, if the formal systems rejected such
milk, the supplier will always find another outlet and that milk will get
into the food chain through other channels and thus the formal systems
will be the losers.
Unfair competition was reported as another governance issue
driving compromised food safety, particularly by large processing
companies and dairy cooperatives (formal sector). These actors cited a
lack of protection by KDB from the informal sector who were said to
trade freely with minimal costs and without licenses, and yet they
dominated the milk market. The frustration in regulation of the in-
formal sector was described from the aspect of KDB’s attempt to for-
malize the informal sector (Leksmono et al., 2006). This is also seen in
the current study where city council officials charge a daily fee for the
noncompliant traders and retailers (hawkers or selling outside a pre-
mise which is against the law). However, the central question is what
food safety value is added with more flexible regulation and increased
compliance? More studies are needed to fully understand this re-
lationship, particularly in systems where the milk structure is vast and
liberalized like in Nairobi. Consumers are always looking for value in
whatever commodity or services they seek. In the Nairobi milk system,
it seems the government is not adding value through regulation, seen by
the enormous number of people trading without licenses. These actors
felt like regulation was an extra burden that increased operational costs
without increasing profit potential. As a result, out of the 56,446 traders
in the country, only 2203 were active in DTA (879 in Nairobi).
Therefore, large amounts of milk was flowing through the informal milk
marketing channels as demonstrated in other studies (FAO, 2011a).
However, other researchers argue that regulation enhances food safety,
but this is possible only in systems where government regulation in-
centivizes product quality linked to increased profit potential and the
infrastructure supports business development (Gereffi et al., 2005).
Otherwise, if regulation does not offer any added value to both pro-
ducers and consumers, consumers will continue to obtain milk from
informal sources. Consumer will need to push for quality for effective
transformation, but with a rapidly increasing population (especially
poor people), quality may not necessarily be the priority.
In the current study, various sanctions were mentioned to enforce
regulation. These included negative sanctions like rejections of poor-
quality milk from farmers and suppliers, deregistration of members
from cooperatives for breaking agreements, prosecution of defiant
traders and positive incentives such as payment of bonuses. But why is
it that milk safety is not improved with the prevailing sanctions?
According to Kaplinsky and Morris (Kaplinsky and Morris, 2000a), the
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power to govern requires the capacity to sanction behavior directed
against transgressions (the “stick”) and a reward system for con-
formance (the “carrot”). Considering our results, we argue that there is
a clear need to organize milk marketing in the city to enhance adequate
governing. Incentives must consider the fragmented governance system
(KDB, city council, public health offices), milk scarcity and high de-
mand, which leads to ease of selling mild that has been rejected else-
where. As it is currently, incentives may not be strong enough to
counter illegal practices and the benefits for not complying are higher
than the losses that come with being caught up by the law.
4.1. Policy implications
There are challenges in achieving food safety goals within the cur-
rent formal regulation framework which has enough provisions for
promoting food safety (Dairy Industry Act, Public health ACT, Legal
Notice No.209 of 2011 Veterinary and Paraprofessionals ACT).
However, compliance to various rules and regulations is hindered by
the complex procedures for acquiring the multiple licenses and milk
trading permits which are also expensive. At the same time, there ap-
pears to be added advantage for most traders who do not comply with
official rules and regulations since they are able to successfully compete
at milk sourcing and marketing while they evade regulation.
Our analysis highlights the importance of understanding govern-
ance to improve food safety. There have been previous attempts aimed
at organizing the dairy sector through formalization of the informal
sector among other efforts to improve food safety (Omore and Baker,
2009). In Kenya, formalization involves obtaining several licenses and
permits (see example in Table 5), a premise that must comply with
specific hygienic and operational requirements (KDB, 2020), milk
handling in aluminum/food grade containers and observing cold chain
compliance. We argue that while all these measures could serve to
safeguard food safety, the impacts could be anti-poor, and pro-big
business not favoring most of the small-scale actors who form the vast
and complex Nairobi dairy value chain. Formalization of the dairy
value chain needs to be adaptive to the requirements of the poorest
producers and other actors. The government needs to be cognizant of
the different actors in terms of scale and capacity so that regulation
considers and develops tailored interventions which could be regulated
and charged accordingly (there should not be a one size fits all).
Formalization of the informal sector would require re-alignment of
the fees and licenses in the system. Rather than each regulatory body
raising revenues through small-scale charges imposed on every actor
(e.g. the daily cess fees which should be charged to transporters only,
but which is charged to all actors), charges could be more centralized
through an income tax-based system or other centralized form of rev-
enue generation. No doubt this would require some realignment of
government institutions and their mandates; in developing economies,
some level of political buy-in would no doubt be required for this.
Realigning the sector would also impact the public health and veter-
inary inspection systems relevant to dairy farming and marketing.
Much of the time, these inspections are the basis for ad hoc fees. A key
policy question to be addressed is how to improve regulation without
resulting in a ballooning ad hoc inspection system. There may be in-
novative ways to involve the private sector and/or self-regulation by
farmers and, in particular, farmers groups, in this process. Training in
best practice for all value chain actors would be an essential component
of this.
Some studies have emphasized the value of organized milk trading
systems as a means of improving food safety and governance (Alonso
et al., 2018; Omore and Baker, 2009). However, we clearly show that
subscription to these groups remains very low (Kiambi et al., 2018) and
that membership is usually motivated by a desire to legitimize existing
practice rather than adopt improved practices. The problematic nature
of informally constituted groups is that their trade undermines the
value proposition of larger scale players in the system, and they are
therefore seen as threatening to the formal sector business model. If
these groups are to expand their footprint, some mechanism to ensure
that they are operating in a fair market is required.
There are some limitations and weaknesses that would be important
in interpretation of results from this study. First, data were gathered
mainly through narrations from KIIs and FGDs. Therefore, the actual
magnitude of food safety risks driven by challenges and governance
issues described in this study have not been quantified. However, ef-
forts were made to interview a wide range of people ensuring adequate
triangulation to minimize errors. Risk assessments and microbiological
studies would be valuable to further identify and characterize the
presence of hazards and milk quality in the system.
Second, although the dairy sector is important in the country, data
collection concentrated on milk chains supplying Nairobi and therefore
the results may not be generalizable to the country, particularly more
rural areas. Nevertheless, emerging issues as stated by KDB, LPOs and
PHOs may reflect the country’s situation and the methodology utilized
for this study may be replicated to study the country’s dairy industry.
Lastly, due to the complexity of interplay between challenges, gov-
ernance and their implications on food safety, the study does not pro-
vide a straightforward solution. However, the study has identified key
considerations for improvement of the dairy value chain. A systematic
economic analysis of incentives and distribution of benefits may pro-
vide a more dynamic view of how the complex dairy value chain may
be satisfactorily governed.
5. Conclusion
This study has highlighted the implications of various challenges
and governance issues on food safety. Just as the Nairobi’s dairy system
is fragmented and interdependent, so is the diversity of actors’ re-
lationships, and food safety implementation approaches and practices.
Governance themes were related to weak relationships between gov-
ernment and various stakeholders, unfair competition in the system and
the high cost of multiple licenses through complex procedures. These
were some of the key drivers triggering noncompliance to official rules
and regulations thus triggering of food safety themes that included
inadequate training and extension services; inadequate access to cold
chain facilities, adulteration and low milk quality delivered to dairy
cooperatives and large processors, and lack of food safety training. The
range of issues highlighted are based on stakeholders’ perceptions and
reflects the complexity of the relationships between them. Many of the
governance themes demonstrate the linkages that are both beneficial or
confrontational between the formal and informal sectors, and between
industry and regulatory authorities, with possible direct food safety
consequences. Findings obtained provide indications to decision-ma-
kers of potential governance areas that could help improve efficiency
and food safety along the dairy value chain.
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